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Abstract 
Denmark is a welfare state whose income tax burden is larger than the total tax burden 
of the United States or Japan. Given recent political science accounts of the links be-
tween tax mixes and the welfare state, Denmark seems to be a puzzling anomaly. 
These accounts see income taxation as inherently problematic and claim that “regres-
sive taxes” (social security contributions and indirect consumption) have been condu-
cive to building and maintaining large tax/welfare states. This article provides a sim-
ple explanation of the “Danish puzzle” and challenges the argument about tax mixes. 
What is problematic about income taxation is capital income taxation, but low in-
come taxes are only one of two ways to keep the capital income tax burden moderate. 
The other is to differentiate the tax burdens for capital and labor within the income 
tax. The article also explores the politics of income tax differentiation and suggests 
that Denmark’s high level of income taxation made it easier to maintain and even 
increase this level in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Einkommensteuerlast des Wohlfahrtsstaates Dänemark ist größer als die Gesamt-
steuerlast der USA oder Japans. Im Lichte neuerer politikwissenschaftlicher Theorien 
über den Zusammenhang zwischen Steuermix und Größe des Wohlfahrtsstaates er-
scheint Dänemark als rätselhafte Anomalie. Die Besteuerung der Einkommen wird als 
inhärent problematisch angesehen und „regressive Steuern“ (Sozialabgaben und indi-
rekte Konsumsteuern) sollen Wachstum und Widerstandsfähigkeit des Wohlfahrts-
staates begünstigt haben. Dieses Discussion Paper liefert eine einfache Erklärung des 
dänischen Rätsels und relativiert die Bedeutung des Steuermix: Die Einkommensbe-
steuerung ist problematisch im Hinblick auf die Besteuerung der Kapitaleinkommen, 
aber die Senkung der Einkommensteuer ist nur einer von zwei Wegen, die Steuerlast 
der Kapitaleinkommen zu begrenzen. Der andere Weg besteht in der Differenzierung 
der Steuerlast für Arbeit und Kapital innerhalb der Einkommensteuer. Das Discussion 
Paper analysiert die Politik der Einkommensteuerdifferenzierung und argumentiert, 
dass das hohe Ausgangsniveau der Einkommensteuerlast eine Erhaltung oder gar Er-
höhung dieses Niveaus in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren erleichtert hat. 
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1 Introduction 
Much of the recent literature on the comparative political economy of taxation has 
converged on the following stylized facts. Corporate and personal income taxes were a 
crucial part of the welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, introducing some progressivity 
into the tax system as a whole. In the 1970s, it became clear that income taxes were 
politically and economically more difficult to sustain than other taxes (Wilensky 2002: 
chap. 12). In the 1980s various factors led to a complete reversal of the ideal of pro-
gressive income taxation, with tax rates being cut while revenue reliance shifted from 
income taxes to consumption taxes and social security contributions (Kato 2003: 14). 
Domestically, there was a “paradigm shift” from equity-oriented to efficiency-oriented 
income taxation (Swank/Steinmo 2002: 645). Internationally, there was growing 
downward pressure on both corporate and personal income tax rates (Hallerberg/
Basinger 1998). The result was a serious difficulty or even impossibility of increasing 
income taxes (Beramendi/Rueda 2003: 27; Kato 2003: 22). Hence, “regressive taxes” 
(general consumption taxes and social security contributions) are conducive to build-
ing and maintaining large tax/welfare states (Wilensky 2002; Beramendi/Rueda 2003; 
Kato 2003). 
Against the background of these stylized facts, the Danish case stands out as a puzzling 
outlier. The Danish income tax ratio (revenue/gross domestic product [GDP]) has 
long been the world’s highest, averaging around 30% during the last 15 years. This 
ratio was roughly one third higher than the next-highest ratios in Sweden and New 
Zealand, and significantly higher than the total tax ratio of countries such as Japan 
and the United States in the same period (OECD 2003a). What is more, the Danish 
income tax ratio was around one fourth higher in 2002 than in 1975 (see Table 1). To 
achieve such a revenue level, marginal tax rates also had to stay high. In fact, between 
1970 and 2002 the top personal income tax rate fell by only 4 percentage points (to 
63%). Whereas Denmark’s corporate rate is roughly in line with the OECD average, 
an increasing gap has emerged between its top personal rate and the OECD average. 
Hence, the Danish case is something of an enigma: Why, given the alleged problems 
of progressive income taxes, was it possible to build such a large income tax and even 
increase it after the mid-1980s? 
In this paper I offer a simple explanation: One of the core reasons why high income 
taxes are seen as problematic is that the taxation of capital income gives rise to high 
economic, political, and administrative costs. Hence, building and maintaining large 
welfare states is most likely predicated on keeping the tax burden on capital income 
modest (e.g., Przeworski/Wallerstein 1988; Lindert 2004). Yet low income taxation is 
only one of two ways to keep the tax burden on capital income small. The other is to 
tax capital income at a lower level and less progressively than labor income within the 
income tax. Danish policymakers were able to build and maintain a large income tax 
precisely because they chose the second option: differentiated income taxation. In fact, 
I will show that historically the large Danish income tax was primarily a tax on wages. 
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My account thus explains why high income taxation posed no major obstacle to the 
emergence and resilience of a large tax/welfare state and why increasing tax competi-
tion did not produce major problems for policymakers: Because the effective tax bur-
den on capital income had been low in the past and because tax competition largely 
concerns statutory tax rates on certain types of capital income, the tax reformers of the 
1980s and 1990s could lower the latter while even increasing the former. 
Differentiated income taxation is not without problems. Large tax-rate gaps between 
capital and labor taxation can create economic inefficiency, administrative complex-
ity, and voter resentment. However, although these problems are visible in the Danish 
case and have influenced the politics of tax reform, they have not yet presented a ma-
jor challenge to high Danish income taxes. This insight is important because income 
taxes have important advantages over other types of taxes. Most notably, compared to 
proportional social security contributions and value-added taxes, income taxes go 
relatively easy on low wages, which can help alleviate the employment problems of 
low-skilled persons (Scharpf 2000; Kemmerling 2005). 
The paper is set out as follows. The next section shows that the growth of Danish in-
come taxation was, in the aggregate, largely the growth of a wage tax. The third sec-
tion summarizes the major Danish tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s and explains 
how they were able to cut statutory tax rates on capital income while increasing tax 
revenue. In the following section I discuss the main lesson of the Danish experience 
and put it in comparative perspective. In the fifth section I explore the problems and 
politics of differentiated income taxation. The final section provides a summary of the 
main argument. 
2 Growth and crisis: Danish income taxation 1903–1982 
This section shows that the development of the Danish income tax was largely the 
reverse of what one would expect from the stylized facts summarized in the introduc-
tion. The growth of the Danish income tax was made possible by large but unsystem-
atic tax privileges for the most important types of capital income. This approach un-
dermined the revenue-raising potential of capital income taxation and the progressiv-
ity of the income tax. 
The Danish personal income tax was instituted (permanently) in 1903, the corporate 
income tax in 1922 (Kraus 1981: 191). To show that the income tax was characterized 
by large tax privileges for capital from the start, I focus on what are generally consid-
ered the three most important types of capital income (Sørensen 2001: 12): (a) house-
hold saving in the equity of owner-occupied housing, (b) pension savings through 
institutional investors, and (c) retained corporate profits. 
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First, from the inception of the income tax, homeowners benefited greatly from very 
liberal rules for the deduction of interest payments from taxable income: they could 
fully deduct mortgage payments. Such a deduction is no “tax expenditure” if the re-
turn on the investment in owner-occupied housing is taxed at the same tax rate at 
which the interest is deductible. Although Denmark also introduced a tax on the 
rental value of owner-occupied housing in 1903, this tax never balanced the value of 
the mortgage deduction (cf. Lefmann/Larsen 2000: 192–193; Müller 2000). 
After World War II, the political Left wanted to reduce this tax privilege but was hin-
dered first by the veto of the Right and later by anticipated electoral costs. Because 
more and more workers had been acquiring homes, cutting back on tax expenditures 
for homeowners was politically risky. In 1973, a Social Democratic proposal to reduce 
tax deductions even provoked a rightist splinter, which developed into the Center 
Democratic Party and caused heavy electoral losses for the Social Democrats (Esping-
Andersen 1985: 186, 265–266). As a result, the return on investment in owner-occupied 
housing continued to be taxed at lower effective rates than was labor income. 
Second, pension contributions were considered part of taxable income by the laws of 
1903, and the law of 1912 explicitly included all forms of voluntary or compulsory 
contributions. In 1922, however, personal contributions were made deductible up to a 
ceiling, as policymakers wanted taxpayers to save for their retirement. From then on, 
and until the early 1980s, the growth of the income tax was accompanied by a growth 
in tax privileges for pension savings (Vesterø Jensen 1985; Ervik 2000: 172–173). In 
1924 employer contributions to pension funds became deductible and fund income 
tax-exempt, in 1955/56 the ceiling for the deductibility of pension contributions was 
abolished, and in 1958 the overall approach to taxing pension savings was codified. In 
1961, tax incentives were further extended by introducing individual pension ac-
counts in order to increase savings. In 1972 all contributions to capital lump-sum 
Table 1 Danish taxes as percentage of GDP 
 1924 1948 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 
Total taxes 10.8 20.4 29.9 39.2 40.0 43.9 47.4 47.1 49.4 49.8 
Income taxes  4.6 8.9 13.7 20.1 23.6 24.3 27.1 27.6 30.0 29.4 
Personal income taxes – – 12.4 19.1 22.4 22.9 23.9 24.8 26.7 26.3 
Taxes on capital income 
of households 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
−.6 
 
−.7 
Taxes on income from 
self-employment 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
1.3 
 
1.2 
Corporation tax – – 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.3 1.5 2.0 2.9 
Income taxes OECD  – – 9.0 10.4 11.6 12.4 12.7 13.2 12.8 13.4 
Notes: For some entries, 2001 values are given in the last column. The OECD average is unweighted and
refers to the “OECD Total” entry in OECD (2003a: 77). Income taxes on the self-employed include social 
security contributions.  
Sources: OECD (2003a). The data for the years 1924 and 1948 come from Flora (1983: 262, 291), data on 
income taxes of households and self-employed from Eurostat (2004: 146). 
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pension saving schemes were regarded as employer contributions, so that taxpayers’ 
own contributions became fully tax deductible as well. 
Finally, the corporate income tax was never a source of much revenue (see Table 1). By 
1965, Danish total taxation had grown to around 30% of GDP, of which 12.4% was 
due to personal and only 1.4% due to corporate income taxation. What is more, while 
personal income taxes almost doubled in the following 15 years, reaching 23% in 
1980, corporate tax revenues remained unchanged. Like most other OECD countries, 
Denmark relied heavily on investment incentives in order to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects on investment and growth (Andersson et al. 1998). In addition, even statutory 
corporate tax rates were not particularly high in Denmark. In 1970 the rate was 36%, 
roughly half the top personal rate and much lower than corporate rates in other 
OECD countries (see Figure 1). 
Notes: All tax rates include local and state taxes as well as temporary surcharges. The distinction between 
personal income taxes and social security contributions is based on OECD (2003b). The OECD average is 
unweighted and includes 21 advanced OECD countries. For the 1970s, the variation in the average is partly 
accounted for by missing observations.
Sources: Tax rate data base constructed by the author. For details about coding and sources, see Ganghof 
(forthcoming).
Figure 1 Top marginal tax rates in Denmark and the OECD, in %
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As a result of these and other tax expenditures for capital income, the growth in Dan-
ish income taxation was mainly the growth of wage taxation. Although this develop-
ment was to a large extent policymakers’ deliberate response to the high economic, 
political, and administrative costs of taxing capital income, the unsystematic nature of 
tax privileges for capital created an aggregate tax burden for capital which was below 
what policymakers had intended. Most notably, the combination of liberal interest-
deductibility rules and low taxation of pension savings and owner-occupied housing 
accounts for the fact that taxes on personal capital income have historically tended to 
imply a substantial loss of revenue for Danish governments (Sørensen 1998). Sørensen 
(1988: 300–301) estimated that in 1986 tax revenue collected from personal capital 
income was minus 1.6% GDP, which was roughly balanced by the revenue from cor-
porate taxation (see Table 1). The aggregate tax burden resulting from the “income” 
tax was essentially that of a pure wage tax. 
The unsystematic forms of tax discrimination in favor of capital income – which ex-
isted in the other Nordic countries as well – undermined not only the revenue yield of 
Danish capital income taxation but also its efficiency and equity objectives (Nordic 
Council for Tax Research 1993). First, marginal effective tax rates on different types of 
savings and investment varied excessively, thus hindering an efficient allocation of 
capital. Second, the massive subsidization of private debt by means of lenient interest-
deductibility rules depressed household savings. Third, the massive tax privileges for 
capital income also favored tax avoidance schemes and reduced the effective progres-
sivity of the income tax. In response to these problems, Danish policymakers started 
to reform income tax policy in the early 1980s. 
3 Reform and further growth: 1982–2003 
From 1982 to 1993 and after 2001, tax reform took place under Center-Right minority 
coalitions, from 1993 to 2001 under Social Democratic-led coalitions, most of which 
were in a minority position, too. As we will see, there was broad partisan consensus 
about the basic pillars of income tax reform. Policymakers agreed that the fiction of 
joint and equal taxation of capital and labor incomes had to be abandoned in order to 
make (differentiated) income taxation both more efficient and more equitable. 
In the early 1980s, tax privileges for private pensions were reduced, partly as a re-
sponse to criticism of the labor movement. After the Social Democratic minority gov-
ernment’s proposal to abolish the tax exemption of interest income from private pen-
sion funds had been blocked by the non-socialist opposition parties in 1982, a similar 
bill was passed by the Center-Right coalition in 1983 (Nannestad/Green-Pedersen, 
forthcoming). The bill introduced a “real interest tax” of 40% on pension fund re-
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turns above a long-term real yield of 3.5% on the capital stock. Savings from before 
1983 were exempted, however, so that the effective tax rate was initially much smaller. 
In 1985, broad partisan agreement was reached on a fundamental tax reform to take 
effect from 1987. A Dual Income Tax (DIT) was introduced, which separated capital 
and labor taxation (Lotz 1993). Most types of capital income were subjected to a uni-
form proportional tax rate of 50%, whereas wages continued to be taxed progressively 
at somewhat reduced marginal rates (the top rate fell from 73 to 68%).1 The capital 
income tax base was broadened, so that the 50% rate applied to interest, dividends, 
imputed rents from owner-occupied housing, imputed returns to capital invested in 
unincorporated businesses, and certain capital gains. The idea behind the DIT was to 
make capital income taxation more “market-conforming” (Swank 1998) without con-
straining the progressivity and revenue-raising potential of wage taxation too much. 
Tax competition was not yet a concern. In fact, the corporate tax rate was raised from 
40 to 50% in order to align it with the tax rate on private capital income. This align-
ment is crucial in order to achieve the efficiency advantages of uniform and propor-
tional capital income taxation (e.g., Sørensen 1998: 23). 
Arguably the most important effect of the reform was to reduce the tax value of inter-
est deductions. In the old system, interest payments (i.e., negative capital income) had 
been deductible against the top marginal tax rate on wages of up to 73%. This was the 
result of the futile attempt to tax all capital and wage income jointly. By reducing the 
capital income tax rate to 50%, the DIT greatly reduced the tax value of interest de-
ductions and thus the tax privileges granted to homeowners. The consequence was 
less subsidization of private debt and the housing sector, greater effective progressiv-
ity, and higher revenue from capital income taxation. 
While the DIT model served as a model for subsequent reforms in the other Nordic 
countries (Ganghof 2005), Danish policymakers started to move away from it (for 
reasons to be discussed in more detail in the fifth section). In a reform passed in 1993, 
they established a more differentiated income tax. The reform was passed by a Social 
Democratic-led majority coalition but based on the proposal of a committee that had 
been established by the Center-Right government in 1992 (Sørensen 1998). A strong 
effort was made to again include positive capital income into the progressive rate 
schedule applying to wages. Some capital income was taxed jointly with wages: inter-
est income, the (still underestimated) rental value of owner-occupied housing, and 
                                                        
1 The reform did not abolish progressive capital income taxation entirely. First, indirect pro-
gressivity by means of a basic tax allowance was retained. Second, as a concession to Social 
Democrats an element of direct progressivity was retained by applying a 6% national surtax to 
high capital income. This surtax was a “gross tax,” that is, interest payments typically had a tax 
value of only 50%. 
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short-term capital gains. By contrast, long-term capital gains and dividends were 
jointly taxed under a separate two-bracket rate schedule, which – together with the 
corporate income tax already paid – resulted in marginal tax rates similar to the rate 
on the other, progressively taxed capital income. To make this re-inclusion of capital 
income into progressive income taxation possible, marginal tax rates on labor were 
cut, phased in over a five-year period. The top personal rate (ceiling) fell from 68 to 
58%. Roughly one half of the cut in marginal rates was financed by the introduction 
of “green” excise taxes on energy and water use, the other half by new “social security 
contributions” (OECD 1996: 46).2 
Many important types of capital income were considered too “sensitive” to be (re-) 
included into the progressive income tax. The tax rate on the retained profits of both 
corporations and unincorporated businesses was reduced to 34%. This was most of all 
a response to increasing competitive pressure on corporate tax rates (Andersson et al. 
1998: 118). There was also no intention to re-increase the tax value of interest deduc-
tions (i.e., the tax rate on negative capital income).3 Owners of shares in a quoted 
company were fully exempt from capital gains tax after a holding period of three 
years, provided their total share portfolio did not exceed a certain amount. Finally, 
pension savings certainly continued to be treated under separate tax rules. 
Another major income tax reform passed in 1998 continued along the same reform 
path. The booming Danish economy provided the government with the chance to 
further reduce the tax value of interest deductions and thereby dampen consumption. 
The resulting tax reform, based on an agreement between the Social Democratic-led 
minority coalition and the left opposition parties, reduced the tax value of interest 
deductibility to 32% from 2001 onwards (OECD 2000, 86–89). Apart from this, the 
lowest income tax rate at the central government level was reduced in steps from 8% 
in 1998 to 5.5% in 2002, a tax allowance for positive capital income taxed at the top 
marginal tax rate was abolished, and the top personal tax rate was increased from 58 
to 59% (see Figure 1). The cut in the bottom income tax rate was partly financed 
through increases in environmental taxes. 
The preferentially taxed types of capital were also subject to reform. The taxation of 
the rental value of owner-occupied houses was replaced, in the vast majority of cases, 
                                                        
2 A proportional gross tax on wages was introduced, earmarked to finance labor market policy. 
The contribution rate for employees increased from 5% in 1994 to 8% in 1997, and an em-
ployers’ contribution was introduced in 1997 at a rate of 0.3%, increasing to 0.6% in 1998 
(OECD 1994: 42). This gross tax financed almost half of the cuts in personal income taxes. 
Because these contributions are essentially income taxes, they are included in the computation 
of marginal income tax rates in Figure 1.  
3 It was slightly reduced by the reform, to 46%, but to mitigate the adverse effects on the cost of 
housing finance, the imputed income from owner occupation was lowered from 2.5 to 2% of 
the housing value, up to a certain limit. 
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by a municipal property tax on the “accommodation value of an owner-occupied 
home.”4 A flat rate on interest from pension savings of 15% was introduced from 
2001. The tax rate on retained business profits was reduced to 30% in 2001, again 
mainly due to concerns about tax competition. 
At the end of 2001, Social Democratic-led governments were replaced by a Liberal-
Conservative minority government, but this did not change the government’s basic 
approach to income tax reform. The income tax reform passed in 2003 and to be im-
plemented from 2004–2007 contains very moderate income tax cuts, rising to 0.75% 
of GDP in 2007. The comparatively high top personal income tax rate of around 63% 
will not be reduced. Instead, the main elements of the tax reform are an increase in 
the threshold for the medium tax bracket and an earned income tax credit. 
The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in lower statutory tax rates but higher 
revenue. The capital income tax revenue from the household sector continues to be 
slightly negative, but the positive revenue from corporations and the self-employed 
contributes to positive revenue from capital income taxation (see Table 1).5 For 2002, 
Eurostat puts the total capital income tax burden at 3.5% of GDP, which is higher 
than in the past but still only around 12% of total income tax revenue, with earned 
income accounting for the other 88%. If we take the size of the tax bases into account, 
the difference is smaller but still pronounced: the average effective income tax rate on 
capital is put at 16.1%, the corresponding rate for (employed) labor at 39.9%. 
4 The Danish experience in theoretical and comparative perspective 
The crucial lesson from the Danish case is that real-world “income taxes” can be very 
different things. Their tax base varies, depending on which types of capital income are 
taxed and at what rates. A textbook income tax would lead to an equal effective tax 
burden on capital income and wages, but, as we have seen, a real-world income can be 
similar to a pure wage tax, that is, it can lead to a zero aggregate tax burden on capital 
income. 
                                                        
4 This tax was intended to partly counterbalance the tax value of mortgage deductions – a value 
that is still high by international comparison (OECD 2000: 86). This partial replacement of 
income taxation on owner-occupied housing by property taxation was thus not a substantive 
change of the tax burden, but rather a reaction to voters’ resentment against income taxes on 
owner-occupied housing. 
5 Note that the income of the self-employed also includes wages. Hence, Eurostat’s estimate of 
the capital income tax burden is somewhat exaggerated. 
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This variability of the income tax base is not sufficiently acknowledged by the litera-
ture on the links between tax mixes and the size of the tax/welfare state. Wilensky 
(2002) and Kato (2003) argue that “regressive taxes” (i.e., social security contributions 
and indirect consumption taxes) have been conducive to building and maintaining 
large welfare states. Kato (2003: 197) notes the obvious Danish exception to this ar-
gument and explains it by the fact that “the country has no revenue items that corre-
spond to social security contributions in other countries and that it finances social 
security expenditures by a general revenue reliant heavily on income tax.” Although 
this may count as an explanation of why Danish policymakers wanted to create and 
maintain an exceptionally high level of income taxation, it does not answer the ques-
tion of how they were able to do it. 
I offer a straightforward answer: The main reason why “regressive taxes” tend to be 
conducive to building large welfare states is that they go relatively easy on capital in-
come (cf. Przeworski/Wallerstein 1988; Lindert 2004). This point is also emphasized 
by Wilensky and Kato. Wilensky states that income (and property) taxes, but not con-
sumption and payroll taxes, imply a heavy tax burden on capital and are therefore a 
“drag on economic growth” (Wilensky 2002: 392). However, the Danish experience 
shows that low income taxation is only one of two ways to keep the capital income tax 
burden moderate. The other is a differentiated income tax which taxes wages much 
more highly than capital income. Similarly, Kato (2003: 199) acknowledges that there 
are certain theoretical types of direct taxes that go easy on capital income and that 
these taxes could “thwart” the association between regressive taxation and large wel-
fare states. However, in her view these taxes are “still far from being implemented” 
(Kato 2003: 199).6 This is misleading. For while the differentiated income taxes im-
plemented in OECD countries do not resemble any ideal-type tax, the aggregate tax 
burdens they create are often much closer to pure consumption or wage taxes than to 
textbook income taxes (see also, e.g., Gordon et al. 2004). The Danish case study has 
made this very clear. 
This interpretation suggests that there should be no linear relationship between the 
total income tax burden and the effective tax burden on capital income. To test this 
expectation, we need a measure that splits personal income tax revenue into its capital 
and labor components and then expresses the combined revenue of corporate and 
personal capital income taxation as a percentage of the underlying tax base. Such data 
are difficult to come by because adequate information on the relative shares of labor 
and capital income in personal income tax revenue is generally lacking (Carey/Rabe-
sona 2002). Fortunately, Eurostat (2004, in collaboration with the European Commis-
                                                        
6 Kato means direct consumption taxes that are implemented like income taxes but whose tax 
base is identical to that of value-added taxes. For a more detailed discussion of the tax base of 
consumption taxes and their difference to income taxes, see, e.g., Hubbard (1997). 
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sion) has gathered this information on the basis of national sources. I therefore use 
Eurostat’s measure of the “implicit tax rate” on capital income, which is available for 
15 European Union countries (the EU-15) for the years 1995–2002. 
Figure 2 shows that there is indeed no linear relationship between total and capital 
income taxation. Rather, it suggests a decreasing marginal “effect” of income taxation 
on capital income taxation. Countries with high income taxes, such as Belgium, Swe-
den, or Denmark, do not have systematically higher tax burdens on capital income 
than do countries with low income taxes, such as Spain, France, or Austria. The only 
exception is Finland, but its high tax burden on capital income is balanced by a very 
low tax burden on stocks of capital.7 Hence, the comparative evidence also suggests 
                                                        
7 If we look at the relationship between total taxation and total capital taxation (income and 
stocks), a picture similar to that in Figure 2 emerges. The main difference is that the outlier 
with by far the highest capital tax burden is not Finland but France (Eurostat 2004: 294), a 
 
Figure 2 Income tax ratio and implicit tax rate on capital income, in %
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that the relationship between tax mixes and the welfare state is spurious. What seems 
to matter most is the underlying tax burdens on capital (income) and labor, which are 
influenced by tax mixes but also by the internal structure of income taxes. 
This insight is also important for the social science literature on so-called tax expendi-
tures. This literature has looked at tax relief for certain types of capital income, most 
notably pension savings and owner-occupied housing, largely as forms of “hidden” 
welfare provision (Howard 1997; Ervik 2000). The previous discussion highlights the 
fact that such relief also has a straightforward taxation rationale: Tax expenditures for 
capital income are one way of keeping the tax burden on capital income moderate. 
Hence, tax expenditures, like regressive tax mixes, may to a significant extent simply 
follow from the need to keep the overall tax burden on capital income moderate. This 
logic is well recognized in the public-choice literature on taxation (e.g., Hettich/
Winer 1999: 59), but not always in the political science literature. For instance, 
Steinmo (1993: 114, emphasis in the original) has argued that “postwar economic 
growth turned progressive taxes … into enormously lucrative revenue machines. They 
were so lucrative that tax policymakers could offer special tax expenditures and in-
crease tax revenue.” This is true as far as it goes, but the causal arrow most likely also 
goes in the other direction: Because policymakers offered special tax expenditures to 
capital income, they could build lucrative revenue machines without hurting eco-
nomic growth. 
Finally, the lessons of the Danish case are also important for the literature on the do-
mestic effects of globalization and tax competition. Arguments about these effects 
often do not differentiate between different types of capital income or discuss how 
heavily capital income had been taxed before increasing tax competition. Sophisti-
cated explanations are advanced for why we do not see a “race to the bottom” in the 
overall tax burdens on capital (Basinger/Hallerberg 2004). Yet once we accept that (a) 
competitive pressures vary greatly across different types of capital income, that (b) 
many types of capital income had not been taxed highly in the past, and that (c) com-
petitive pressures tend to be strongest with respect to statutory tax rates, a much sim-
pler explanation of the lack of a race to the bottom is available (cf. Ganghof 2000). By 
differentiating statutory tax rates and broadening the capital income tax base, policy-
makers could reduce statutory – and, if necessary, also effective – tax rates on the most 
mobile types of income (mostly capital income), while increasing the tax burden of 
less mobile types of capital income. 
                                                                                                                                                       
country with a very low income tax burden and thus a very large share of “regressive taxes” 
(Kato 2003). 
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More concretely, Danish policymakers reduced the corporate tax rate from 50 to 
30%.8 Yet they not only recouped revenue by broadening the corporate tax base but 
also increased the tax burden on economically less sensitive capital income that had 
been taxed at a low level in the past. The main example is the reduction in tax subsi-
dies to owner-occupied housing. Finally, policymakers differentiated income tax rates 
in order to insulate wage taxation from corporate tax competition. The top personal 
income tax rate stayed roughly twice as high as the corporate tax rate in order to avoid 
major revenue losses and/or a substantial reduction of progressivity. To see the im-
portance of this rate in revenue terms, consider that in 2002 it set in already at around 
90% of the earnings level of an average production worker (OECD 2003b). Maintain-
ing a high top rate was possible because direct competitive pressures on personal in-
come tax rates were absent.9 
5 The problems and politics of differentiated income taxation 
Of course, differentiated income taxation is not without problems. It has economic 
costs because tax rate differentials may affect the decisions of economic actors in 
negative ways. It has administrative costs because tax differentials create incentives for 
tax avoidance, which have to be countered by administrative means. And it has politi-
cal costs because voters may resent tax differentiation. This resentment is likely to be 
deliberately fostered by both left and right opposition parties. Left parties are likely to 
push for higher capital income taxation, right parties for lower taxation of (high) 
wages. In this section, I intend to show that these problems also existed in Denmark, 
but that their effects have so far been rather modest. In addition, I suggest that high 
income taxation itself as well as Denmark’s basic political institutions have been con-
ducive to maintaining a large income tax despite the problems of differentiated in-
come taxation. 
                                                        
8 One could argue that some of the capital income that is taxed progressively together with 
wages is also sensitive and could therefore be expected to be taxed under special tax rules as 
well. However, a closer look shows that this is in fact the case. Hagen, Norrman, and Sorensen 
(1998: 195) state that Danish portfolio investors have so far “tended to channel the bulk of 
their foreign portfolio investments via financial intermediaries and institutional investors 
which are subject to special tax rules …” 
9 Some are based on the assumption of direct pressure on personal income tax rates (e.g., 
Hallerberg/Basinger 1998). Yet in Denmark and elsewhere sensitive types of personal income 
are removed from the ambit of progressive income taxation. If unincorporated businesses are 
a problem, they are subjected to special rules, and the same is true for particularly mobile 
groups of taxpayers such as foreign expatriates of international companies (Ganghof 2000). 
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The problems of differentiated income taxation had two main effects. First, they con-
tributed to the fact that Danish policymakers turned away from the DIT model – which 
was invented by them and proved to be extremely successful throughout the OECD 
world (Ganghof 2005) – and moved toward a more complicated form of differenti-
ated income taxation in the 1990s. The reason: the crucial task in designing a DIT is to 
find a proportional capital income tax rate that is low enough to apply it to all main 
types of capital income but high enough to keep the difference to the top tax rate on 
labor within acceptable limits. The very high level of income taxation made it difficult 
to find this rate. Sticking to the DIT model after the 1987 reform would have required 
a general reduction of the capital income tax rate from 50 to 30%. Corporate tax 
competition was very important in this respect: The tax rate on retained corporate 
profits had to fall, and achieving the simplification advantages of the DIT model re-
quired an alignment between this rate and the rate for personal capital income 
(Sørensen 1998: 23). This large a reduction of the uniform capital income tax rate, 
however, was out of the question. 
Three reasons stand out. First, lowering the capital income tax rate uniformly would 
have increased the gap between the tax rate on capital and the top rate on labor, which 
would have fuelled tax arbitrage as well as voter resentment about the obvious inequi-
ties of the DIT model. Already with the relatively high capital income tax rate of 50%, 
it “had been difficult to gain popular acceptance of a tax system which taxes large 
positive income from wealth at a considerably lower marginal rate than income from 
labour” (Sørensen 1998: 23). A tax rate of 30% would have made this problem much 
more severe. The second reason is related: In the search for popular acceptance of the 
tax system, it seemed necessary to again include into the ambit of progressive taxation 
those types of capital income which were less affected by tax competition and did gen-
erate some revenue (see the third section). This revenue was to be used for reduction 
of the marginal tax rates on wages. Third, given the DIT model, a large cut in the gen-
eral capital income tax rate would have implied an equally large cut in the tax value of 
interest deductions. Yet in the early 1990s, such a cut would have been disastrous for 
the Danish housing market. The 1985 reform had already created severe strains in this 
market, as the cuts in tax subsidies were capitalized in prices and led to a drop in the 
value of real estate. A considerable number of homeowners no longer could cover their 
mortgages with the market value of their real estate and went bankrupt (Nannestad/
Green-Pedersen, forthcoming). In short, Denmark’s high income tax burden required 
even more differentiation of tax burdens than was possible under the DIT model. 
The problems of differentiated taxation had a second, related effect: They made the 
overall tax system somewhat less progressive than it would probably have been without 
them. The reason: to make the re-inclusion of some types of capital income into the 
progressive income tax possible, marginal tax rates on labor had to fall, especially at 
the top. The top rate fell from 68 to 59%. As discussed in the third section, this reduc-
tion was partly financed by new “social security contributions,” which, in fact, are 
proportional (gross) income taxes on wages (OECD 2003a: 130). 
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Both effects – the dilution of the DIT model and downward pressure on the marginal 
tax rates on high wages – are visible in other countries as well, for example Australia, 
Germany, Norway, and New Zealand (Ganghof/Eccleston 2004; Ganghof, forthcom-
ing). However, it must be emphasized that the resulting constraint on the progressiv-
ity and revenue-raising potential of the Danish income tax has so far been rather 
moderate. In concluding this section, I shall discuss two factors that have likely con-
tributed to this result. This discussion uses Germany’s tax reform experience as a con-
trastive foil. 
First, the existence of high income taxation itself has likely been conducive to main-
taining high income taxation in the 1980s and 1990s. The reason is as follows. The 
main contender of differentiated and dual income taxation is a flat income tax (here-
after: Flat Tax). This tax reform model simply extends the uniform proportional capi-
tal tax rate of the DIT to labor. It thereby achieves maximum tax simplification. The 
downside of the Flat Tax is, of course, reduced progressivity (in labor taxation). How-
ever, indirect progressivity can be achieved by maintaining a large basic tax allowance. 
Therefore, the Flat Tax is an extremely attractive model for countries with moderate 
income tax burdens. If total income revenue amounts to less than, say, 15% of GDP – 
as it does in most countries shown in Figure 2 – an indirectly progressive Flat Tax 
with a rate of 20 to 25% could be introduced in a revenue-neutral manner and thus 
seems very attractive. Right-wing parties and business organizations are likely to em-
brace this model and denounce the “inequity” of differentiated income taxation, thus 
stacking the decks in favor of lower and flatter income taxation. In fact, this kind of 
dynamic is visible in a number of OECD countries, such as Germany (Ganghof, forth-
coming), and some East European countries have already adopted the Flat Tax. The 
EU member state Slovakia, for instance, implemented a flat rate of 19% in 2004. 
A similar kind of dynamic is much less likely to arise in Denmark because a revenue-
neutral switch to a Flat Tax is virtually impossible. With an income tax burden of al-
most 30%, a real-world Flat Tax with a significant basic allowance would require a tax 
rate that is nearer to 40% than to 30% (Nielsen/Frederiksen/Lassen 1999; Broste Re-
port n.d.). Given tax competition, however, increasing the Danish corporate tax rate is 
out of the question. To the contrary, it seems to be only a matter of time until it will 
be further reduced. Because the favorable properties of the Flat Tax also depend to a 
large extent on the alignment of corporate and personal taxation, revenue-neutral Flat 
Tax reform lacks credibility. Of course, right-wing parties could combine the Flat Tax 
with a large-scale shift of the tax burden onto proportional “social security contribu-
tions.” Yet any such maneuver is associated with very high political risks. It contra-
dicts what is sometimes called Canard’s tax rule (Canard 1801): “Old taxes are good 
taxes.”10 In short, when income taxes are low to begin with, differentiated or dual 
                                                        
10 Canard’s rule is frequently cited in tax reform debates in Germany. The causal mechanisms 
cited by Canard, however, are outdated. He believed that the entire tax burden is eventually 
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income taxation requires special political justification, whereas flat taxes seem like the 
natural endpoint of tax policy-learning. When income taxes are high to begin with, 
the opposite is more likely. 
The second factor contributing to the resilience of high income taxes in Denmark is 
political institutions. Denmark is a truly majoritarian country in the sense of Mill 
(1958 [1861]) and Nagel (2000). It combines electoral proportionality (and hence 
multiparty politics) with legislative majority rule. There are no strong institutional 
veto rights for minorities. This institutional context can induce parties to adopt ac-
commodating policy stances in order to become part of legislative majority coalitions 
(McGann 2004). By contrast, if parties have institutionalized veto rights, their incen-
tives to search for pragmatic compromises may be reduced. 
A comparison with the German tax reform experience can help to illustrate this point. 
In Germany there are two powerful veto players in tax policy: the upper house, or 
Bundesrat, and a very activist Constitutional Court. In combination, these two veto 
players forced a center-left government of Social Democrats and Greens to pursue 
substantial cuts in marginal tax rates and a significant net reduction of the income tax 
burden (Ganghof, forthcoming). The main reason for this requirement was that even 
a minor gap between the corporate tax rate and the top rate on personal income was 
seen as a constitutional problem. Minimizing the tax-rate gap therefore became one of 
the paramount goals of tax reform in Germany, vigorously defended by the opposi-
tion parties holding power in the Bundesrat. As a result, the top personal rate had to 
fall from 56% in 1998 to 44% in 2005 in order to allow for a corporate tax rate (in-
cluding local taxes) of just below 40%. In effect, corporate tax competition spilled 
over into personal income taxation. If the Danish constitution gave right-wing actors 
similarly strong veto rights, the requirements of corporate tax competition would 
have probably also had more far-reaching effects on personal income taxation. 
These conclusions are in many ways preliminary. The main purpose of the discussion 
is to shift attention to the politics of differentiated income taxation. If this type of 
taxation is one major way to reconcile large tax/welfare states with the structural con-
straints of open market economies, then the conflict over the size of the welfare state 
will inevitably lead to a conflict over income tax differentiation. Although the political 
science literature should avoid exaggerating the problems of differentiated income 
taxation, it should not avoid studying the politics of it. 
                                                                                                                                                       
shifted equally onto everyone, so that any change in the tax mix would induce costly adjust-
ment processes without being able to change tax incidence. 
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6 Conclusion 
The main argument of this paper can be summarized succinctly: Moderate capital 
income tax burdens are conducive to building and maintaining large tax/welfare 
states. The dominant way of keeping these burdens moderate is low income taxation. 
This has led some political scientists to argue that “regressive taxes” (social security 
contributions and indirect consumption taxes) are conducive to building and main-
taining large tax/welfare states. However, this argument fails to see that there is a sec-
ond way to keep the tax burden on capital income moderate: differentiated income 
taxation. If this is recognized, the very high Danish income tax burden ceases to be an 
anomaly. Danish policymakers decided to discriminate against wages within the in-
come tax rather than shift much of the income tax burden onto social security contri-
butions. 
Differentiated income taxation does create economic, administrative, and political 
problems. However, the Danish case shows that these problems should not be exag-
gerated. Pragmatic differentiation of tax burdens within the income tax is possible 
without undermining economic and administrative efficiency and without prohibitive 
political costs. This insight is important because progressive income taxes have an 
important advantage over standard forms of social security contributions and value-
added taxes: they go easy on low wages and can thus help mitigate the problems of 
low-wage employment (Scharpf 2000; Kemmerling 2005). In this respect income taxes 
are instrumental for building efficient and resilient welfare states. Mainly for this rea-
son, it is important to better understand the politics of differentiated income taxation. 
Although the present paper has contributed insights on the Danish case, more work 
remains to be done. 
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